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Easements and covenants are second only to the "fee tail" or perhaps to
"springing uses" as a symbol of the mindless formalism of traditional
property law. Aside from that, when we consider what easements and
real covenants do-bind land owners to some previous owners' agree-
ments in which the current owners have had no say--the puzzle is that
a free and rational nation permits these legal arrangements at all.'
Even the name, "servitude," which Professors Reichman and French
prefer to use in their excellent articles,2 has a slight ring of
involuntarism.
As these two authors tell us, we tolerate these "dead hand" ar-
rangements because they provide a long lasting security for land devel-
opment and encourage property owners to invest in the long term
improvements that are essential to the productive use of real estate. As
Jeremy Bentham told us over a century ago, secure expectations of re-
turn are a sine qua non of enterprise;3 if the community wants to en-
courage my neighbor to invest time and effort in a solar heating panel,
it had better let him agree with me that I and my successors will keep
my trees from overshadowing his roof.
Professors French and Reichman agree that the old rules and limi-
tations, clumsy though they are, do help to carry out this basic purpose
of securing property for land development.4 Their argument is not that
the old rules are senseless, but rather that their functions can be served
* Visiting Professor, Northwestern University Law School. Acting Professor, University
of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law. B.A. 1962, Antioch; M.A. 1963, University of
Chicago; Ph.D. 1969, Cornell; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
1. See Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 12, 12 (1978).
2. French, Towarda Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving The Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1261 (1982); Reichman, TowardA Unfed Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177
(1982).
3. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109-22 (C. Ogden ed. 1931) (1st ed. 1840).
4. French, supra note 2, at 1263-64; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1183.
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more easily.5 We should look to the functions that the old rules per-
form, they say, rather than to the rules themselves.6 If we do, not only
will we be able to deal with all the different forms of servitudes in a
unified fashion, but we will also be able to uphold useful servitudes
while applying streamlined methods to rid ourselves of the outdated
ones.
7
This is a thoroughly sensible approach. But it is well to recall that
we are devising new strategies in an old war among generations of land
owners, and we should not be overly surprised if we wind up in some of
the same old trenches. As the following sections will elaborate, a major
function of the older doctrines has been rather political. Many of the
courts' complex distinctions help us to infer whether a new taker has
voluntarily accepted the obligations of a servitude-an inference espe-
cially important in a society that aspires to conduct its affairs on the
basis of free choice.' Indeed, as rhetoric, the inference of continuing or
renewed assent to some degree defuses the intergenerational conflict
inherent in these long-lasting obligations.
The quest for signs of continuing assent-the effort to find a rea-
sonable inference that new parties voluntarily undertake the obliga-
tions of their predecessors-is likely to persist even in a reformed law
of servitudes. In the following sections I will discuss at least two as-
pects of this persistence. First, even in a reformed law of servitudes,
there could be at least a partial reelaboration of the old distinctions that
attempted to ascertain continuing voluntary assent to servitude obliga-
tions; any such new distinctions could be uncomfortably close to the
old distinctions among "easements," "equitable servitudes," and "cove-
5. French, supra note 2, at 1265-66; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1182.
6. French, supra note 2, at 1266; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1182.
7. French, supra note 2, at 1304; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1258-59.
8. Professor French may have voluntary acceptance partly in mind when she asserts that
the older doctrines served "fairness" functions. French, supra note 2, at 1282, 1284, 1295. Con-
sent, whether real or constructive, may be a fundamental element in a concept of fairness, as it is
in contractarian political theories. Seegeneralo, J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discuss-
ing a version of social contract theory). But fairness may also include other elements. My own
view is that the narrower issue of consent is more helpful than "fairness" in understanding servi-
tude law because the parties' continuing acceptance speaks more directly to the intuitive objec-
tions to the "dead hand" of ancient servitudes. Leaving aside inefficiency considerations, our
chief worry about old servitudes is that they may be dictatorial, holding later landowners to obli-
gations that they might prefer to negotiate for themselves. At the same time, we do not want to
release owners from obligations that they have agreed to. See Browder, supra note 1, at 12-13.
If continuing voluntary consent is viewed as an underlying theme in servitude law, the later
19th century importation of contract theory into servitude law may be more easily explainable,
even if, as Professor Reichman argues, contract theories were doctrinally unsatisfactory in the
context of servitudes. Reichman, supra note 2, at 1211-30.
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nants." Second, we might well be wary, as the older courts were, about
a reform doctrine that too easily relaxes servitude obligations when we
cannot infer assent of the beneficiaries.
I. OLD DISTINCTIONS IN NEW BOTTLES
The traditional rules about servitudes took three rather different direc-
tions, depending on the form of the original agreements. From the
point of view of the "burdened" property owner, these forms were
roughly as follows:
Situation 1. I agree for myself and my successors that you may use
my land or some part of it for X (traditionally an "easement").
Situation 2. I agree for myself and my successors not to do Y on my
land (traditionally an "equitable servitude"). 9
Situation 3. I agree for myself and my successors to do Z on my
land (traditionally a "covenant").
Clever law students can easily collapse these three servitudes into one:
your right to cross my lot equals my refraining from impeding your
crossing which equals my use of my property in such a manner as to
leave open your way. If it is all a matter of labels, why not treat all of
these situations as a single form of property right, as our authors sug-
gest? The older servitude doctrines did not do so, and the reasons for
their divergent rules could persist in such a way as once again to split
our authors' unified approach. One concern that loomed very large in
the older distinctions had to do with considerations of notice, consider-
ations about which I must digress for a moment.
From the point of view of aiding land development, a major pur-
pose of notice is to provide security to buyers of property. If buyers
risked unanticipated obligations from unexpected beneficiaries, they
might be reluctant to invest in land development, and ultimately land
would be less than fully utilized. Just as importantly, however, notice
permits an inference of the continued voluntary character of servitude
obligations. If future takers purchase a piece of property with notice of
a restriction made by a predecessor, then, in the absence of duress or
fraud, they may ordinarily be thought to have bargained for the prop-
erty with the restriction in mind, and to have shown themselves willing
to abide by it.
Notice of servitudes may take at least two forms: notice in the
documents or records of title, and notice that is signalled upon inspec-
9. This is the least distinct category. As Professor Reichman points out, Situation 2 could
also be characterized as a "negative easement" or a "covenant." Reichman, supra note 2, at 1181.
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tion of the land, by the duties and properties involved in the servitude
itself. In a time of incomplete or nonexisting legal methods for record-
ing servitudes, the courts focused on the latter type of notice. Indeed, as
our authors tell us, a chief function of the old "touch and concern"
doctrine was to assure that the physical character of the land obligation
gave notice to future takers.'" But even aside from "touch and con-
cern" matters, Situations 1, 2, and 3, as outlined above, differ sharply
with respect to their inherent capacity to give notice. If in the past I
agreed that you had permission to drive over my lot, one who buys
from me should see your tracks and should ask about your rights
before buying my property (Situation 1). However, if I agreed not to
build on my lot so that you could enjoy the sunshine (Situation 2), or if
I agreed to maintain a mill so that you could grind your corn (Situation
3), then one who buys from me may have no clear visual or other sen-
sual signals upon which to base an inquiry about your possible servi-
tude rights that would bind him as my successor. As our authors tell
us, the older rules elaborately distinguished between these situations,
and enforced only those servitudes that were likely to give notice of
themselves."I But, our authors say, an adequate recording system obvi-
ates many of these distinctions, since the recorded documents give no-
tice even of nonobvious obligations.'
2
In this line of thinking the authors are in good company; indeed,
as Professor Reichman's account of the American "horizontal privity"
rule suggests, even the older courts apparently tried to expand the en-
forcability of servitudes to the limits of the recording system.' 3 If all
types of servitudes can be recorded as property interests, then suppos-
edly we can dispense with the divergent rules for Situations 1, 2, and 3,
since we need not rely on physical features of the land to give notice.
Away, then, with anomalies such as the ban on "negative" servitudes
that are passively enjoyed or carried out, since the recording system
will tell the buyer what he needs to know about the restriction, and
with whom he must deal to extinguish it. When one buys property with
a recorded restriction, one may be presumed to have known about and
to have accepted the obligation.
But is the presumption valid? Perhaps, but only insofar as the re-
cording system is adequate. Some of the comments in these articles
10. French, supra note 2, at 1290; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1233.
11. French, supra note 2, at 1286-87, 1290; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1190.
12. French, supra note 2, at 1284; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1190.
13. Reichman, supra note 2, at 1220-21.
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suggest that, because of lapses in the recording system, we may not be
finished with the older inquiries about types of properties and duties in
the different servitudes, and about their different inherent abilities to
give notice of themselves.14 Both of our authors have to deal with that
horribly fascinating character in property law, the adverse possessor,
who has no record notice of restrictions at all.' 5 And quite aside from
the idiosyncratic adverse possessor, our authors suggest that the record
documents might not completely inform even one who sees them.'
6
For a servitude to burden or benefit successors in interest, these
authors agree, the original arrangers must have so intended;' 7 presuma-
bly we respect their intentions so as to encourage others to make ar-
rangements that enhance the use of land. But how do we know
whether they intended a servitude to run? They may have said so in
the recorded documents, but mere boilerplate statements of intent will
not suffice.' 8 Conversely, our authors say, even if the parties said noth-
ing in the recorded documents, we may think that some servitudes were
intended by implication.19 Where, then, may we turn to discover
whether the parties might have intended that their arrangements would
bind future takers?
In this task it is clear that we must resort once again to the charac-
ter of the properties and to the duties involved in the purported servi-
tude. Suppose that my neighbor and I agreed that I would restrict my
use of my property. If we had intended that my obligations extend to
my purchaser, we-and especially my neighbor-surely would have
wanted to make sure that my purchaser was aware of them. Hence, the
issue of our original "intent" overlaps with the notice that my successor
receives: the less obvious the obligations, the more likely we would be
to state and record them explicitly. Thus, even without our explicitly
saying so, my neighbor and I probably thought that my purchaser
should have to allow my neighbor to drive over the right-of-way, since,
as anyone can see, the neighboring lot needs access. However, it is not
so clear that we expected my purchaser to refrain from putting up a TV
antenna, and it is even less clear that our expectation was that my pur-
chaser should keep the house painted blue. The real issue is, of course,
what a buyer could tell about the obligation by inspection of the prop-
14. French, supra note 2, at 1309; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1251.
15. French, supra note 2, at 1299-1300; Reichian, supra note 2, at 1251-52.
16. French, supra note 2, at 1309; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1251.
17. French, supra note 2, at 1284-86; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1244.
18. French, supra note 2, at 1290, 1306.
19. French, supra note 2, at 1289; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1244.
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erty, and these different situations would convey different information.
Even with a unified doctrine of servitudes, then, it might not be too
surprising if the courts, in implying intent, once again use distinctions
reminiscent of the older distinctions among "easements," "equitable
servitudes," and "covenants." 20
Perhaps even more importantly, in the modem use of servitudes
vestiges of the older distinctions can be expected to reappear in the
interpretation of covenants for the governance of planned communi-
ties. My condominium deed tells me that I am a member of the Home-
owners' Association and that I must abide by its rules, even new rules
that are not now in force. All the new rules? Certainly not, for they
must be, as the courts say, "reasonable."'" And what is a "reasonable"
Association rule? On the whole, it is one that I should have expected.22
Often, though not always, reasonable rules are associated with the
physical maintenance of the community2 3-a matter that might once
have fallen under the doctrine of "touch and concern."
Condominium units' proximity and shared space require consider-
able accommodation, of course, and as a unit purchaser I should expect
that other owners' needs will affect in various ways my property and
my uses of it. Those needs predictably give rise to Association rules.
But once again the older distinctions may reemerge because they relate
to the kinds of rules of which I was "on notice" that my Association
might pass. Thus, I might be charged with anticipating a rule that al-
lows community custodians to come into my unit to repair the electrical
20. The courts might be aided in their analysis by using Hohfeldian labels in these various
situations, and might describe the different categories as "privilege," "immunity," or "right/duty"
servitudes. However, given the capacity of labels to take on a life of their own, I am not so sure
that Hohfeld's labels, in the long run, would be much less confusing than "easement," "equitable
servitude," and "covenant." For Hohfeld's categories, see Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement
and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66, 69 n.8 (1917); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as
Appliedin Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 128-58 (1913). For an application of these catego-
ries to homeowners' association rules, see Reichman, Residential Private Governments- An intro-
ductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 268-73 (1976).
21. Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Amoruso v. Board of Managers of Westchester Hills Condominium, 38 A.D.2d 845, 846, 330
N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (1972); Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 544,
270 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (1966).
22. See Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 8, 449 P.2d 361, 362 (1969) ("no secret"
that architectural controls are used in planned communities).
23. See Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 545, 270 N.Y.S.2d
829, 832 (1966) (distinguishing a "lifestyle" regulation from those "essentially pertaining to use of
the land"). See also Forest Park Coop., Inc. v. Hellman, 2 Misc. 2d 183, 184, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685,
686 (1956) (washing machines prohibited from cooperative housing units because of adverse im-
pacts of the machines on other residents).
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system; I might have even reasonably expected a rule that prohibits me
from adding a wading pool without the architecture committee's ap-
proval; but should I have anticipated a rule that requires me to keep a
Doberman security dog? In interpreting the "reasonableness" of the
Association's rules, even in a reformed law of servitudes, we may once
again find the courts adumbrating familiar distinctions with respect to
notice. They may well find differing levels of "reasonableness"--i.e.,
my ability to predict the need and to anticipate a rule-in situations
.where (1) I must let someone else do X in my unit; (2) I must refrain
from doing Y in my unit; or (3) I must do Z in my unit. Thus, in the
attenuated form of the "reasonableness" of community rules, we may
once again find the ghosts of easements, equitable servitudes, and cove-
nants-not to speak of "touch and concern."
II. TOUCHING AND CONCERNING CHANGED
CIRCUMSTANCES
In the older interpretations of servitudes, the fabulously frustrating
doctrine of "touch and concern" occupied a central place. The authors
here sensibly perceive that the function of "touch and concern" is to
require that servitudes enhance the use of a real estate resource.24 If
the servitude's net effect is to assist efficient real estate utilization, it
serves the purpose for which we have servitudes; moreover it is likely to
involve rights or duties that land owners might expect, and thus gives
reasonable notice of its continuing nature to future buyers.25 A re-
formed servitude law, then, might well substitute a phrase such as
"land-development-related" for "touch and concern," if only to shed
the baggage of those old touch and concern doctrines, with all their
vagueness and circularity.2 6 Professor French even suggests that, since
"touch and concern" issues collapse with "usefulness," we can dispense
with "touch and concern" altogether, if we can apply an expanded doc-
24. French, supra note 2, at 1289; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1232-33. See also Reichman,
Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 143-50 (1978) (socioeconomic purpose of
the "touch and concern" rule) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Supervision].
25. Judicial Supervision, supra note 24, at 143-50.
26. As to circularity, see Berger,A4 PolicyAnalysis ofProrises Respecting the Use ofLand, 55
MINN. L. REV. 167, 210-11 (1970). Among other things, Berger discusses the famous "test" pro-
posed by Bigelow: a covenant touches and concerns the land if it affects the legal interests of the
parties as owners of the land, and particularly if it affects the value of those legal interests. The
test is circular, however, since the court's determination regarding "touch and concern" deter-
mines whether the covenant affects the legal interests of the parties as landowners. Berger's own
approach is based on ordinary language analysis, in which a covenant would be held to touch and
concern the land if the normal expectations of society would so dictate. Id. at 211-12.
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trine of "changed circumstance" to rid ourselves of useless servitudes.27
This is a sensible approach, but there is a rub: to whose under-
standing of "usefulness" (or land-development-relatedness) are we to
turn? In putting forth the doctrine of "changed circumstance" to quash
or limit obsolete servitudes, our authors imply that our own current
understanding of usefulness should prevail over the understanding of
the original parties.28
There is something to be said for this view. If the servitude no
longer aids land development on the basis of today's evaluation of costs
and benefits, then it seems inefficient to enforce it against current tak-
ers; what is more, today's buyer is less likely to expect an antiquated
servitude (assuming that the record notice is insufficient).29
It is well to recall, however, that the older doctrines were not al-
ways quite so free about the "changes of circumstance" that could re-
lease servitudes. For one thing, the courts' understanding of the
relevant "changes," and their distinctions among different types of
changes, indicated that obsolescence was not the only matter at issue.
As with the older concern for notice, judicial treatment of "changed
circumstance" demonstrates a special concern for the parties' accept-
ance of the situation-but here in the weaker form of their passive ac-
ceptance of the extinguishment of the servitude. If the neighbors in a
residentially-restricted subdivision allow a change by failing to object
when one of their fellow owners builds a warehouse, then that "change
of circumstance" may be used as a way of saying that they acquiesced
in the relaxation of the restriction. They could have objected and did
not, and thus signalled that they did not care very much if the servitude
was relaxed." As some earlier judges realized, however, a quite differ-
27. French, supra note 2, at 1300-01.
28. French, supra note 2, at 1301; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1259.
29. Professors French and Reichman also mention an argument derived from an interpreta-
tion of the original parties' intent: presumably the original parties did not intend the covenant to
last beyond the point of obsolescence. French, supra note 2, at 1310; Reichman, supra note 2, at
1259. See also Browder, supra note 1259, at 38 (changed conditions doctrine). This argument
could be too facile; it is certainly conceivable that the original parties entered into a covenant
precisely because they feared that some desired use, which they wished to preserve, might come to
be viewed as obsolete in the future.
30. See, e g., Margolis v. Wilson Oil Co., 342 Mich. 600, 602-03, 70 N.W.2d 811, 812 (1955)
(failure to object to previous violations of regulation constitutes abandonment). Where "changed
circumstance" applies to changes within the neighborhood, the doctrine resembles estoppel,
laches, or abandonment defenses to servitudes, and interior changes are often denominated by
those other names. All may be viewed as doctrines by which the beneficiaries of a servitude are
inferred to accept passively the loss of the restriction. Id. See also Burton v. East Point Motors,
Inc., 209 Ga. 872, 874, 76 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1953) (plaintiffs, who waited until building was almost
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HeinOnline -- 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1410 1981-1982
1982] COMMENT
ent situation is presented when the change occurs outside the cove-
nanted area. Let us suppose that a would-be warehouse operator buys
a restricted lot in the hopes of building his warehouse, and then argues
that the encroachment of manufacturing uses, outside of the restricted
area, is a "change of circumstance," rendering the servitude obsolete
and hence unenforceable because the costs of maintaining the servitude
exceed the benefits. The courts have been slower to grant relief on this
basis, since the neighbors never had a claim against the outside
changes, and their inaction cannot be construed as acquiescence to a
change within the restricted area.3 Moreover, the warehouse operator
took the restriction into account when he purchased with knowledge of
it.32 In any event, if the restriction is as useless as he says, and the
property so much more valuable without it, then he should be able to
buy the neighbors' permission relatively cheaply.
At this point, of course, the infamous holdout appears: the neigh-
bor who insists on his rights under an obsolete servitude to which no
completed to object, abandoned their right to do so). But see Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 182-
86, 79 N.W.2d 733, 739-41 (1956) (violation must be so general as to frustrate the object of the
regulation if failure to object is to constitute abandonment); East Parker Properties v. Pelican
Realty Co., 335 So. 2d 466, 471 (La. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 338 So. 2d 699 (La. 1976) (must be
"frequent and substantial" violations of the restrictions without objection to constitute abandon-
ment).
Even if the change occurs within the restricted area, the courts will not deny enforcement of a
servitude unless the change was one to which the plaintiff might have been expected to object,
again implying that the theory behind nonenforcement is one of acquiescence: we cannot infer
acquiescence unless the change in question might have been expected to matter to the plaintiff.
See Whitaker v. Holmes, 74 Ariz. 30, 33, 243 P.2d 462, 464 (1952); Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa at
183, 79 N.W.2d at 739.
Passive consent under any of these doctrines ought not be lightly inferred in large projects,
where the beneficiaries of the servitudes might face substantial transaction costs or free rider
problems in enforcing the servitude. For some methods to deal with this problem, see Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L.
REv. 681, 717 (1973).
A concept of acquiesence may underlie marketable title statutes, which bar assertion of prop-
erty interests unless they have been asserted through a process of recording within a given statu-
tory period of time. See P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES 368-71 (2d ed. 1970).
31. See, e.g., Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 33 Del. Ch. 199, 206, 91 A.2d 404, 408 (Del. 1952);
Tones, Inc. v. La Salle Nat'I Bank, 34 Ill. App. 3d 236, 242, 339 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1975); Eilers v.
Alewel, 393 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Mo. 1965); Fox v. Miner, 467 P.2d 595, 599 (Wyo. 1970). Looser
interpretations of changed circumstance doctrine can draw stinging dissents. See, e.g., Wolff v.
Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 698, 284 P.2d 802, 804 (1955) (Spence, J. & Traynor, J., dissenting); Downs
v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 750, 254 P. 1101, 1103 (1927) (Waite, C.J., Richards, J. & Curtis, J.,
dissenting); Hecht v. Stephens, 204 Kan. 559, 565, 464 P.2d 258, 264 (1970) (Fontron, J.,
dissenting).
32. See Tones, Inc. v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 34 Ill. App. 3d 236, 243, 339 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1975);
Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 168-69, 172 N.E. 455,
457-58 (1930); Fox v. Miner, 467 P.2d 595, 599 (Wyo. 1970).
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one now would agree because its costs outweigh its benefits. To over-
come this mean or greedy holdout, our authors would apparently apply
a "changed circumstance" doctrine, either to ignore the holdout's
claims altogether, or to compensate them only at the "reasonable" price
of damages.33 There are several grounds for objection to this use of
changed circumstance doctrine in pursuit of efficiency. First of all, it is
rather surprising that use of the doctrine is suggested by authors who
otherwise urge that servitudes be viewed as property interests. While it
is true that the neighbors may "hold out" against the rational ware-
house operator, they would be equally capable of "holding out" if the
warehouse firm needed their land in fee.34 The right to "hold out," for
whatever idiotic reasons, is an aspect of the right to hold property.35 It
is normally relaxed only through an eminent domain proceeding for a
public purpose, a proceeding which is approved by the elected repre-
sentatives of the community. The mere fact that some other private
individual might put my property to a higher market-value use than I
do does not mean that he is serving a public purpose, so that I have to
"sell" to him at the "price" of market damages. If we are to take servi-
tudes seriously as property rights, then the neighbors' holdout is per-
fectly legitimate.
Second, the holdout has too often been treated as a rascal. Some-
times the purported holdout has a genuine interest in his property right,
however irrationally inflated that interest may seem to the world at
large.36 To protect such an owner, we have to protect the opportunist
as well, except insofar as doctrines such as duress or unconscionability
enable us to distinguish between the two. 37 And sometimes the holdout
33. French, supra note 2, at 1301; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1258-59. Of the two authors
here, Professor Reichman appears to take a somewhat more cautious view of the use of "changed
circumstance" and notes the doctrine's likeness to a private eminent domain. See Judicial Sqpervi-
sion, supra note 24, at 157.
34. In any event, a clever buyer may be able to use neighborhood pressure to overcome the
holdout. He may, for example, offer a sum of money to each member of the entire neighborhood,
on the condition that they all consent to the extinguishment of the servitude. See R. ELLICKSON &
A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 1023 (1981).
35. Calabresi and Melamed, in Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972) argue that the whole point of protecting an
entitlement by a property rule (as opposed to a liability rule) is to assure that the entitlement
passes only by voluntary agreement, giving the owner a "veto" over transfer.
36. See Cardozo's comments in Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem,
254 N.Y. 161, 168, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930) ("Rightly or wrongly, [the objecting landowner] be-
lieves that the comfort of his dwelling will be imperiled by the change, and so he chooses to abide
by the covenant as framed.").
37. These doctrines may be available only to one with whom the "holdout" ultimately does
strike a deal; the holdout's refusal to deal does not give rise to a wealth transfer. Cf. Gordley,
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may confer a long term benefit, even though the benefit is not obvious
at the time. One has only to. read Professor Dunham's charming story
about the crotchety Montgomery Ward, who thwarted construction in
Chicago's downtown lakeshore park by insisting on his servitude right
to an unobstructed vista to the lake, to realize that today's "holdout"
may be tomorrow's culture hero.38 Third, as I shall discuss shortly,
holdout problems can be substantially diminished by limiting servi-
tudes to a fixed duration which is understood by the parties at the out-
set and renegotiated periodically.
More fundamentally, when we test past restrictions by present-day
conceptions of obsolescence, we are signalling to our contemporaries
that their agreed upon servitudes may shift with the winds. Romantic
philosophers might well regard such shifts as a breach of the social
contract among generations.39 But hard-nosed utilitarians also look to
the effect on current enterprisers. The prospect of shifting legal inter-
pretations of "usefulness" introduces an uncertainty into servitude
transactions, such that the parties might be discouraged from the very
land development that servitudes are intended to secure.4" The social
costs might well be considerable. Consider the developer who is will-
ing to invest effort and expense on a handsome building if she knows
that her work will last. She might attempt to preserve it through a cov-
enant restricting alteration or demolition. But with a relaxed doctrine
of "changed circumstance," can she be sure that her work will outlast a
change in taste comparable to that separating the Victorian period from
the 1950's? And might she not simply give up the idea altogether?
If we are seriously concerned about servitudes that outlast their
usefulness for land development, there is a simpler and less unsettling
way to limit inefficient servitudes. Although our present authors prefer
servitudes of potentially infinite duration,41 other authors have urged
that servitudes be limited to some fixed period.42 Indeed, with the pos-
Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1613-16 (1981) (an exchange must occur to enable
a party to challenge the validity of the deal).
38. Dunham, The Chicago Lake Front andA. Montgomery Ward, 25 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 11
(Winter 1979) (originally published as an appendix in WELFARE COUNCIL OF METROPOLITAN
CHICAGO, OPEN SPACE AREAS (1966)).
39. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 108-11 (Arlington House ed.
1966).
40. J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 115-16. See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness
Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Iust Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214-
18 (1967) ("demoralization costs," "efficiency gains," and "settlement costs").
41. French, supra note 2, at 1315 n.254; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1232.
42. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 212 (Tech. Bull. No.
50, October 1964) [hereinafter cited as HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK]; Ellickson, supra note
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sible exception of servitudes designed to assure permanently the contin-
ued duration of our natural or historic heritage, no servitude should be
expected to last in perpetuity.43 Servitudes rather should be geared to
the expected life of the development they serve-land development, af-
ter all, is the chief reason why we put up with servitudes in the first
place. The parties should state a limited length of time that they think
the servitude will enhance the development; the legislatures too can
state at least a presumptive life span of servitudes for different develop-
ment purposes. Only thereafter should the courts tell us what a reason-
able life expectancy might have been at the time the servitude was
created-not what we now think its appropriate life is. Beyond that
period, let the servitude be open for renegotiation."
French's and Reichman's papers suggest that a principle reason
for nonnegotiated extinguishments of servitudes is that some changes
may render negotiation impossible, so that the beneficiaries of a servi-
tude cannot be assembled to agree upon its extinguishment even if they
might be amenable. 45 Taken seriously, this suggestion argues that the
changed circumstance doctrine should be confined to situations in
which the claimants' rights have become too complex for extinguish-
ment through ordinary negotiation.
One approach to this problem is to limit and specify the claimants
to servitude rights, so that future negotiation for extinguishment re-
mains possible. This function, Professor French points out,4 6 was once
30, at 717; Note, Covenants Running with the Land- Viable Doctrine or Common.Law Relic?, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 139, 182-83 (1978). For a statute imposing such a limitation, see MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 184, § 27 (West 1977).
43. Servitudes for the preservation of natural (and arguably historical) resources might be
perpetual because they are designed to assure no development, a situation that could last in-
defintely. See infra note 47.
44. Limiting the duration of servitudes should lessen the difficulties of interpreting the origi-
nal intent of the parties as to whether and how long the servitude should endure. If the parties set
their own duration, the outside duration might be established by the reasonable life of the prop-
erty development that is served by the restriction. Cf. HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, supra
note 42, at 212 (advocating periodic review of covenants). At the expiration of the agreed upon
duration, the servitude may be viewed either as terminated (and renegotiable), or as presump-
tively renewed unless objected to by some specified percentage of affected property owners. Id. at
212, 336. The presumptive-renewal method is undoubtedly preferable where the parties limit the
servitude to a period shorter than the expected life of the land development, e.g., condominium
upkeep requirements that are set at a mortgage period, or at the first expected complete ownership
turnover.
45. French, supra note 2, at 1316; Reichman, supra note 2, at 1256. See also Judicial Supervi-
sion, supra note 24, at 156 (prolonged negotiations and holdouts to raise compensation makes
consensual extinguishment difficult to achieve at times).
46. French, supra note 2, at 1287.
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served by restraints on easements in gross and by the requirement that
servitudes benefit some ascertainable land. No doubt some old doc-
trines can be improved or expanded, while still limiting the numbers of
potential claimants with whom future extinguishment must be
negotiated.47
No doubt too, given the complexity of modem real estate develop-
ment, we should expect some matters to become too complex for nego-
tiation. Here, the "changed circumstance" rule might be applied to
limit one's remedies to damages, even where there is no inference of
acquiescence to the change. But where negotiations are possible, it is
hardly compatible with a property conception of servitudes to use
"changed circumstance" as a general defense to servitude obligations,
so as effectively to rearrange property rights through a kind of private
eminent domain.4
A general use of changed circumstance doctrine is not important if
servitudes are limited in duration; if they are so limited, then the origi-
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42a to -42c (1978) (allowing governmental bodies and
charitable corporations to enforce servitudes for natural and historic preservation, even though
they may own no benefitted land). See generally Brenneman, Historic Preservation Restrictions. 4
Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN. L. REv. 231 (1976) (reviewing state historic preservation
statutes); Note, Conservation Restrictions: A Survey, 8 CONN. L. REv. 383 (1976) (reviewing the
development of state historic preservation statutes).
48. It is of course true that some current law does just this. See Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass.
590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1974), interpreting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 30 (West 1979). In
Blakeley, the beneficiary of a covenant for light and air was confined to a damage remedy for a
violation of the covenant, on the basis of a statute prohibiting an injunctive remedy where such a
remedy was not "in the public interest." The court's discussion of the "public interest" dwelt
largely on the point that the restricted hotel property would have much greater market value (and
hence taxable value) if the restriction were removed. The decision suggests that servitudes might
have little effect as property rights in the face of changing market forces; simply because the
market would sufficiently enhance the hotel's value without the restriction, the hotel owners could
extinguish the restriction by paying market-value damages to the owner of the benefitted property,
rather than that owner's asking price.
As the authors here point out, there are comparable solutions in nuisance law. See the much-
discussed Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970), in which the court held that a cement plant was a nuisance to nearby residents, but con-
fined their remedy to damages. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. The dissent
viewed this solution as an unlawful exercise of eminent domain for a private purpose. Id. at 230-
31; 257 N.E.2d at 876; 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Boomer, however, involved
multiple claimants, and could be viewed as a solution required by the difficulty of negotiating a
voluntary transaction. Moreover, it is at least arguable that "private eminent domain" in the
nuisance context is more justifiable than it is in the servitude context, since the parties in nuisance
cases have never had any consensual dealings with each other to define their respective property
rights, and the courts must settle those often uncertain rights willy-nilly. The parties to a cove-
nant, on the other hand, are at least indirectly related through the consensual arrangements of
their respective predecessors in interest-arrangements that defined the very property interests at
issue and that presumably were known and accepted by the current parties.
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nal parties can count on an appropriate duration that they set them-
selves, while the rest of us can be assured that the "dead hand" will be
removed unless future parties overtly signal its continued usefulness.
For the sake of utilization of land, the parties to a servitude agree-
ment should be able to rely on its duration over the period in which
they regard it as land enhancing. But if, as I believe to be the case, we
can tolerate lasting servitudes more easily because we can infer the con-
tinued voluntary acceptance of successors in interest, then there is no
reason why we should not, from time to time, require the successors to
make their acceptance explicit.
CONCLUSION
Professors French and Reichman propose worthwhile changes in the
lawof servitudes. However, we must remember that the confusing doc-
trines that they attempt to unify developed in response to actual cir-
cumstances relating to the use of property. Any attempt to unify the
concept of servitudes must recognize that these circumstances still exist,
so that the pressures for slightly different rules may reappear in a new
context. Additionally, a "changed circumstance" doctrine may very
well frustrate one of the underlying purposes of servitude law-to se-
cure efficient land development. A better approach is to limit servi-
tudes to a fixed duration that is chosen by the original parties.
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